Isp. (sec.) Effective: 226 - SL due to vains
steering drag loss of 4-5 sec.
Actual: 230
Vac.: 264
Thrust Chamb. 1
Fuel TM-185
20% Gasoline
80% Kerosene
Oxidizer AK-27I
27% N2O4
73% HNO3
Iodium Inhibitor
Propellant Mass (kg) 12,912
Warhead (kg) 760-987-1,158
Type MRBM

A more extensive redesign of the Scud技術 may have begun in the same 1988 time-frame as the modification program that resulted in the Scud-C. 新しいミサイル（No-dong-1、Ro-dong 1、及びScud-Dと様々に呼ばれる。）は、1,000〜1,300km/700〜1,000kgの潜在的射程/運搬能力を有する。 より長い射程は、would cover a wide swath of cities from 東京 to 台北. At the extremity of the higher range, 権威あるアナリストは、ノドンのCEPを2,000〜4,000mと見積もっている。

　原型は、was detected on a launch pad in 1990年5月. 試験飛行は、did not begin until 1993年5月29〜30日, with an apparently successful launch 500km into the 日本海. このノドン-1の飛行試験は、was almost certainly a high altitude flight with warhead separation being demonstrated. All within the 500km SCUD-C/D range profile. That is, the No-dong-1 rose to a much higher altitude with in a 500km range. Propulsion tests began in 1994年8月. To date the flight test program has consisted of this single North Korean test to partial range, along with what were apparently two tests by パキスタン and three by イラン（1発のみが完全に成功した。）. 2000年後半現在、米国防総省は、北朝鮮が在日米軍を打撃できるノドン・ミサイルを製造及び配備し続けていると報告した。

　ノドン・プログラムは、has evidently been plagued by numerous technical and financial problems. 何人かの権威ある観察者は、expected the first production models of the No-dong to be available in 1997, with export shipments soon thereafter. しかしながら、CIAは、ノドンが1996年末までに配備されるとは予測していなかった。Reflecting the difficulties of assessing the precise status of the program, at a News Briefing on 1998年7月9日 国防長官William Cohen states that "What we can say is that 北朝鮮がノドン・ミサイルの開発を完了している, but I am not in a position to comment in terms of when or where or how there has been a deployment of the missile itself."

　ノドン型の運用状態は、不明確なままである。操作員の運用訓練は、1995年中盤に始まったようである。ミサイル保管施設の建設は、1995年7月に始まり、4ヶ所程度の発射基地が、1995年10月 までに管制したという。機動発射機は、1997年3月に北朝鮮北東部に配備され、数基の発射機は、平壌から約100kmの施設にも配備されたという。

　1998年のRumsfeldの報告は、concluded that the "Commission judges that the ノドンが was operationally deployed long before the U.S. Government recognized that fact. There is ample evidence that 北朝鮮が has created a sizable missile production infrastructure, and therefore it is highly likely that considerable numbers of No-dong's have been produced." One of the unclassified discussion papers generated in the preparation of the Rumsfeld report indicated that only a small number of the systems （ミサイルを搭載した10基の機動発射機） have been produced by North Korea and fielded with its own forces ["Iran and Iraq" Michael Eisenstadt, Kenneth Katzman, Kenneth Timmerman and Seth Carus - 1998年3月23日]. 韓国軍筋によれば、北朝鮮は、Scud-A、Scud-B、及びScud-Cミサイルに加えて、1999年初めまでに、少なくとも9基のノドン-1を配備していた。日本筋は、15〜100発のミサイルが現在配備されていると推測している。

?50m (w/GPS guidance)
Reaction time (min) 60
Maximum road speed 70 km/h
Maximum road range 550 km

■設計継承

　ノドンは、represent a significant departure from the prior North Korean practice of incremental improvements on the basic single-engine Scud design, and this departure is reflected in the protracted development history of the system, この単段ミサイルは、apparently incorporates a SS-N-4, Isayev S-2.713M engine with a single large combustion chamber. The closely related イランのShehab-3 and the パキスタンのGhauri-II do reflect this design.

　ノドンのいくつかの様相は、seems to bear a close design resemblance to the early ソビエト製SS-N-4/R-13及びSS-N-5/R-21 SLBM designs. This would not be to surprising, given that these early submarine-launched ballistic missiles were an evolutionary development of the same Scud technology that 北朝鮮により使用されている

　西側でSS-N-4として知られるソビエトのR-13は、used one Isayev S2.713エンジン with larger 1.3m diameter tankage from the Scud 0.88m diameter tankage design and warhead separation from the ミサイル本体. このミサイルは、発射重量13,745kg、射程600km及び本体直径1.3mを有していた。And the R-21, designated the SS-N-5 used the 4 thrust chamber Isayev S-5.38 higher thrust engine and more tankage with perhaps a material change and rearranged propellant tanks along with warhead separation. 本体直径1.4mを有するこのミサイルは、発射重量約19,653kg、射程1,420kmを有した。

　ノドンは、重量15,200〜16,000kg、直径1.32〜1.35m、全長15.895m、射程1,350〜1,500kmを有するという。15,852〜16,852kgの発射重量（760〜1,000kgの弾頭で）を有するノドン・ミサイルの性能は、 falls right in between the two older Soviet SLBM's design. While this may simply reflect the unavoidable consequence of using this proven Scud design approach to achieve a long range missile, other evidence suggest that a more direct connection may exist.

　1992年10月、ロシア保安省は、モスクワのSheremetyevo-2空港において、北朝鮮 に発つ準備をしていた60人以上のロシア人ミサイル専門家を停止させ、and subsequently a 北朝鮮の少将が、エリツィン政府によりペルソナ・ノン・グラータを宣告された。It turned out that これらの技術要員が潜水艦弾道ミサイルの設計局であるV.P. Makayev OKB出身だった. It is difficult to assess the full extent of collaboration and technology transfer between the Makayev局と北朝鮮 during this Gorbachev era, although such a large, senior delegation almost certainly meant that an earlier contact had already been substantially completed with certain critical documentation exchanged as a part of an agreement.

　SS-N-4とSS-N-5は、have been on public display at the ロシア中央軍博物館 since at least 1992. The existence of these missile demonstrates that this is a potential fruitful line of development to extend the range of Scud-derived systems. It certainly represents a proven design concept, in contrast to the less sophisticated Iraqi approach of simply clustering multiple Scuds to achieve longer range. しかし、the apparent slow and uneven progress on the No-dong program since 1992 may not be entirely unrelated to the cessation of active assistance from Russian sources.

■Soviet Design Path of Their First SLBM's

◆R-11

　R-11FM Modified Scud-A, B with one Isayev engine, SS-N-0, The R-11FM was 1959年に配備された。

Body Diameter 0.885 m
Height 10.344 m
Fuel TG-02, mixed Amine 50% triethylamine, 50% xylidine/T-1 Kerosene
Oxidizer AK-20I=(AK-20K) = IRFNA(80% I-HNO3) +20% N2O4
Thrust 8,300 kg f
Burn time 92 sec.

◆R-13/SS-N-4

　R-13/SS-N-4は、 used one Isayev engines S2.713 with larger tankage from the Scud design and warhead separation from the missile body. The propellant tanks were rearranged. This was done for center of gravity control of the launch vehicle. This duel drain points were also used in the R-13/SS-N-4 tankage arrangement to assist that center of gravity control according to Makayev OKB historic documents. 1960年配備。

Range 560 km
Body diam. 1.3 m
Length 11.83 m
Fuel Tonka-250=50% Triethylamine + 50% Xylidine/T-1 Kerosene
Oxidizer AK-27I = 27% N204 + 73% HNO3 with iodium as the inhibitor =IRFNA
Thrust 25,720 kg f
Isp. 216 sec. sea level, 235 sec vacuum

◆R-21/SS-N-5

　R-21/SS-N-5は、used four Scud type thrust chambers to create an advanced higher thrust Isayev engine S5.38 and more tankage was added with a possible material change as well as warhead separation. 1963年配備。

Range 1,420 km
Body diam. 1.3 m
Length 14.2 m
Fuel Amine mixture
Oxidizer IRFNA possibly AK-27P 27% N2O4 73% HNO3 with a different inhibitor
Thrust 33,600 kg f
Isp. 248 sec sea level, 268 sec vacuum

　ノドンが北朝鮮の設計及び製造であることはほとんど疑いないが、it certainly seems to have benefitted from some aspects of the Makayev SLBM program experience and design details. このミサイル技術移転の源泉は、1980年代初めのソビエトの液体燃料SLBMプログラムのキャンセルである。1980年代中盤までに、液体式SLBMのプログラム人員は、were reduced to caretaker status for deployed existing hardware. Effectively the cancellation of the programs resulted in the unemployment for a large group of highly trained rocket personnel. In an effort to re-employ their personnel, Glavkosmos of the Ministry of General Machine building tried to market these SLBM's commercially as 衛星発射機. The effort failed. ロシアと北朝鮮間の正式な技術交換は、probably started in 1988, well before the 1991年のソ連崩壊. How much technology and materials expertise was transferred, if any remains unclear. しかし、the slow pace of this program suggest that some combination of technical and resource constraints have sorely challenged the 北朝鮮のミサイル・プログラム

■How did the North Koreans develop No-dong?

 copy the technology with steel tankage
Scud-B Used one improved Isayev higher Isp engine.
Scud-C like Iraq more fuel with its lengthened tankage and improved Isayev engine.
No-dong-1 Used one engine with a single thrust chamber and four times the scud tankage and warhead separation. SS-N-4/5 like approach.
No-dong-2 Probable redesign for Alumium Magnesiun airframe body via the Chinese and Russian experience previously observed. SS-N-4/5 like approach. All of these programs benefitted from North Korean engineers, technicians, and scientist cooperating on the PRC, Chinese canceled DF-61 program of the mid 1970's.
Taepo-dong-1 Used the No-dong-2 with a Scud-B/C placed on top. Chinese/Russian brains
Taepo-dong-2 Used all new first stage based on CSS-2/SS-5 design approach and an all new four thrust chambered first stage engine based on the No-dong single thrust chambers and a new turbo-pump machinery and a No Dong-2 as its second stage. Certainly the Chinese design approach to the LRICBM known as CSS-3 influenced the Taepo-Dong-2's first stage design. See accompanying drawings etc.

The Scud mods A, B, C, and ND-1 & 2 experience is very similiar to that experienced by the Soviets with its ScudA derived SLBMs and Scud-B program which is almost certainly no coincidence.

■Developing Nations and Warhead Dynamic Performance

　最近、it was suggested that the developing nations missile program warheads would be tumbling about their center of gravity during re-entry, which would then make it difficult to identify. This was because they were not being spun-up along their longitudinal axis prior to re-entry through the atmosphere.

　弾頭は、is much like a bullet fired from a rifle barrel. If the barrel is grooved to spin up the bullet along its longitudinal axis it tends to fly through the atmosphere to its target more smoothly and accurately. If the barrel is not built with this capability, the bullet tumbles uncontrollably about its center of gravity throughout its flight in the atmosphere to its target. This tumbling reduces the accuracy of the projectile.

This kind of missile warhead tumbling was noted in the ballistic flights of イラクのScud-B、Scud-C/Al-Hussein、Scud-D/Al-Abbas弾道ミサイル during the 湾岸戦. In this particular case all of the warheads remained attached to the Scud derived rocket bodies. The length of the Scud-C及びDミサイル bodies and the failure to spin up either the missile with its warhead or separate the warhead after missile spin up made them extremely unstable and in accurate during re-entry to their target.

　今日、this is not the case with North Korean derived warhead technology. 北朝鮮は、successfully demonstrated payload spin up with the satellite launch attempt of the テポドン-1又はPAEUTUSAN-1 booster. The Paeutusan-1 solid propellant third stage both demonstrated a near full duration burn and the spin up of the stage and satellite along its longitudinal axis. しかしながら、the third stage solid motor ruptured, de-orbiting the satellite, almost immediately after achieving orbital velocity.

　それ故、it would be correct to assume that besides 北朝鮮のノドン（テポドン-1の第1段）, both パキスタンのGhauri-II and イランのShahab-3 all benefit from this spin-up technology. The Shahab-3/Ghauri-II both apparently spin up the single booster stage and warhead combination starting at about 10 seconds before the termination of the powered flight at 110秒. At this point after 110 seconds of powered flight the warhead is then separated from the booster stage to fly on a re-entry trajectory that remains stable to its target. With the addition of GPS targeting the warhead accuracy is greatly enhanced. There are still many in the analytical community that question, perhaps correctly, this suggested accuracy of 190m to over 1km超. There can be no doubt that this spin-up technology does improve the accuracy of these warheads over the previously demonstrated poor capability. Since the 弾頭が are not tumbling it in fact enhances the interceptor sensor signature identification capability verses that of a tumbling warheads signature.

Equally revealing is the fact that this is the area where the イランのShahab-3 has repeatedly failed in flight test. If the steering vains are not equally positioned correctly or are defective in any way the missile and warhead combination would tumble about its center of gravity out of control destroying the missile. The resulting tumbling warhead whether attached to the remaining missile body or not would in all probability be destroyed during its re-entry. It is known that イランが has and continues to suffer from a steering vain quality control problem for its Shahab-3弾道ミサイル that the Germans during WW-II solved and that the 合衆国と旧ソビエト連邦が were able to easily resolve with out using specialized coating.